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Abstract
This paper proposes a framework for modelling financial contagion that is based on
SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) transmission models from epidemic theory. This
class of models addresses two important features of contagion modelling, which are a
common shortcoming of most existing empirical approaches, namely the direct mod-
elling of the inherent dependencies involved in the transmission mechanism, and an
associated canonical measure of crisis severity. The proposed methodology naturally
implies a control mechanism, which is required when evaluating prospective immunisa-
tion policies that intend to mitigate the impact of a crisis. It can be implemented not
only as a way of learning from past experiences, but also at the onset of a contagious
financial crisis. The approach is illustrated on a number of currency crisis episodes,
using both historical final outcome and temporal data. The latter require the intro-
duction of a novel hierarchical model that we call the Hidden Epidemic Model (HEM),
and which embeds the stochastic financial epidemic as a latent process. The empirical
results suggest, among other, an increasing trend for global transmission of currency
crises over time.
Keywords: Financial crisis, contagion, stochastic epidemic model, random graph, MCMC
1 Introduction
A financial crisis originating in one country can travel within and beyond its original neigh-
bourhood spreading among countries like a contagious disease. Loosely speaking, this phe-
nomenon, which was a common feature of the major recent crises, is referred to by economists
as ‘contagion’. Contagion by definition can only occur if there are interactions among sub-
jects. These interactions can materialise at different levels and through different channels
simultaneously, some channels being more important during particular events than others.
The literature typically distinguishes between fundamentals-based contagion, a transmission
of a crisis from one country to another through real and financial linkages, also known as
spillovers, and pure contagion where a crisis might trigger additional crises elsewhere for
reasons unexplained by fundamentals. As financial crises spread across countries, they affect
nations with apparently healthy fundamentals and sound policies. The better understanding
we have of their propagation mechanism, the better we are positioned in proposing policy
interventions which can most effectively reduce their contagious spread.
The economics and finance literature includes a number of theoretical models that aim
to explain the contagious spread of crises, emphasising trade linkages (bilateral or third
party, Gerlach and Smets, 1995; Corsetti et al., 1998), financial linkages (Allen and Gale,
2000), as well as models on information asymmetries and investor behaviour (Calvo and
Mendoza, 2000; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002), among others. More recently, recognition of the
inherent complexities and interconnections associated with financial systems has advocated
the need to consider methods from other disciplines such as ecology, epidemiology, biology
and engineering in studying financial networks (May et al. 2008, Haldane, 2009). Indeed,
researchers have turned to alternative methods in modelling financial contagion, which are
largely based on numerical simulations. For example, Gai and Kapadia (2010) study a
percolation-type process on a weighted network of banks as a model of contagion. (Bond)
percolation processes are equivalent to SIR epidemics given appropriate model specification
(Newman, 2010). May and Arinaminpathy (2010) pursue recent advances in the area of
complex ecological systems in a study similar in spirit to Gai and Kapadia, though they
employ a mean field approximation rather than resorting to simulations. Amini et al. (2010)
analyse distress propagation in a network of banks, via a cascading process, and derive
the asymptotic magnitude of contagion. Caporale et al. (2009) make use of agent-based
1
simulation models to investigate the dynamics of financial contagion.
On the empirical front considerable effort has been devoted to documenting the existence
of contagion.Various tests have been proposed in the literature for this purpose including
among others the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test based on correlation coefficients and the
Pesaran and Pick (2007) threshold test. Dungey et al. (2005a, 2005b) provide a review and
comparison of alternative tests of contagion. The bulk of the studies suggest that there is
evidence of contagion. For an overview of the empirical evidence of contagion see Dornbusch
et al. (2000) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). Less emphasis, however, has been placed
on modelling the propagation mechanism of financial crises. A class of models that features
prominently in the empirical contagion literature is that of cross country probit-type regres-
sions of a binary crisis indicator on variables representing potentially important transmission
channels. Such channels have been identified as trade links (Glick and Rose, 1999), financial
links and the common creditor (Caramazza et al., 2004, and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000),
neighborhood effects (De Gregorio and Valdes, 2001), and macroeconomic similarities (Sachs
et al., 1996). More recently, Dungey and Martin (2007) have proposed capturing financial
market linkages during crises through the use of common factors, while Aït-Sahalia et al.
(2010) suggest modelling financial contagion using mutually exciting processes.
In this paper we propose a framework for modelling financial contagion which is based
on SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) transmission models from epidemic theory (see for
example, Bailey, 1975). This class of models addresses two important features of contagion
modelling which are a common shortcoming of most existing empirical approaches, namely
the direct modelling of the inherent dependencies involved in the transmission mechanism,
and an associated canonical measure of crisis severity. At the same time, it allows to in-
corporate features that reflect relevant theoretical and empirical evidence in the literature
through the inclusion of appropriate covariates. The proposed methodology naturally implies
a control mechanism, which is required when evaluating prospective immunisation policies
that intend to mitigate the impact of a crisis. This control mechanism can be implemented
not only as a way of learning from past experiences, but also in real-time as a contagious
financial crisis unfolds.
Specifically, the approach is based on a stochastic epidemic transmission process where
the population of countries is explicitly structured, and a crisis may be propagated both
locally and globally. Having identified all countries that suffered during a particular crisis
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episode, the focus is on how crises spread from an initially affected (or ‘infected’) country
to the rest of the countries by considering their interaction at the local and global level.
We explicitly model regional and global contagious ‘contacts’ and infer the rate of their
transmission. These transmission rates allow us to directly quantify the severity of the
crisis, in contrast to conventional approaches in the literature where severity is measured
by a composite index of macroeconomic indicators, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and
Kaminsky (2006). The methodology also delivers an estimate of the number of countries to
financially support in order to prevent a major crisis.
In the proposed framework a country may experience a crisis not only because of its
direct links to the originally infected (ground zero) country, but also due to local and/or
global contacts with countries that are already infected. Thus, we allow for the so called
‘cascading effect’ following the terminology of Glick and Rose (1999), which is typically
ignored in the literature. In fact, the proposed approach effectively considers the set of all
possible transmission channels of a crisis. Furthermore, it naturally accounts for an increase
in the likelihood of a crisis in a particular country given that there is a crisis elsewhere.
This is explored in Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) as being
consistent with the existence of contagion.
The methodology is illustrated on a number of currency crisis episodes, using both his-
torical final outcome and temporal data. The former provides information on the number
of initially ‘healthy’ countries, that were ever affected or otherwise by a particular financial
crisis. The information provided by the latter allows to estimate the ‘infection’ and/or ‘re-
covery’ times of the crisis, in addition to the trasmission rates. The use of temporal data
is necessary for performing real-time analysis of a crisis spread. It requires the introduction
of a novel hierarchical model, that we call the Hidden Epidemic Model (HEM), and which
embeds the stochastic financial epidemic as a latent process. Our findings, among others,
point to an increasing trend for global transmission of currency crises over time.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the modelling framework
and describe the inference procedure relevant to final outcome data. Section 3 describes the
hidden epidemic model associated with the use of temporal data. In Section 4 the proposed
approach is illustrated with an empirical application to several currency crisis episodes.
Section 5 discusses the relevance of the methodology for policy analysis. Section 6 contains
some further discussion.
3
2 Modelling Framework
Consider the onset of a financial crisis, for example, a currency crisis or a stock market
crash, with contagious effects to a given population of, say, countries. Our interest is in
modelling the process associated with the propagation of the crisis. The approach can be
equally applied to populations of firms or banks, among others.
2.1 The Model
Consider a closed population of N countries, partitioned into regions of varying sizes.
Specifically we will assume that the population contains rj regions/groups of size j, where
r =
∑S
j=1 rj is the total number of regions and S denotes the size of the largest group. The
total number of countries is then N =
∑S
j=1 jrj. The crisis originates in a typically small
number of countries. At the outset, all countries are deemed susceptible to the particular
crisis episode. As the crisis unfolds, each country is considered to belong to any one of
three states: susceptible, infected (and ‘infectious’) or recovered. Such processes are often
referred to as SIR models in epidemic theory. In the SIR model a susceptible country is in
a ‘normal’ state and can be affected by the crisis in question. An infective country is in a
state of crisis and may trasmit it to other countries. At the end of its infectious period an
individual country is considered recovered, in the sense that it plays no further role in the
propagation of the crisis. Thus, we effectively assume that a country may not experience
multiple recoveries within a single crisis, which appears reasonable for such applications.
A country, say j, remains in crisis for a positive random time, denoted by Ij, which is
allowed to follow any specified distribution. The periods for which the individual countries
remain in crisis are assumed to be a-priori independent. While infectious, a country may
transmit the crisis to each country within its region at times given by the points of a Poisson
process of rate λL. Additionally, each country may trasmit the crisis to any given country
worldwide according to a Poisson process with rate λG/N . That is, there are two levels
of mixing between countries, namely at the local and global level. The contact processes
within this construction are assumed to be a-priori independent. This formulation of the
model effectively assumes that each country has local contacts with rate λL + λG/N . Al-
ternative parameterisations of the epidemic model can be obtained using the superposition
and splitting of the Poisson process (see Kingman, 1993). The crisis ends when there are
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no remaining infectious countries in the population. Notice the different scaling of the two
transmission rates. This is a common assumption in two-level-mixing models and it implies
that there will be more infectious contacts locally if the local population grows, while this is
not the case globally.
The model described above is a stochastic epidemic two level mixing model introduced
in Ball et al. (1997), where a detailed discussion of related work can be found. While the
model does not explicitly assume a latent period for the crisis to unfold once a particular
country has been affected, but rather assumes immediate infection, the distribution of the
final outcome is invariant to very general assumptions concerning a latent period (see Ball
et al., 1997; Andersson and Britton, 2000). The two level mixing model encompasses the so
called generalised stochastic epidemic model (GSE), which arises by setting (λL = 0, λG = λ),
that is, assuming all countries mix homogeneously with rate λ. The particular case where the
infectious period is exponentially distributed renders the model Markov. As the population
size increases, it can be shown (e.g. Ethier and Kurtz 1986) that the solution of this Markov
process converges to that of the corresponding system of ODEs known as the deterministic
general epidemic.
Epidemic models in their simple deterministic form are not foreign to the economics lit-
erature. They typically feature in studies of treatment and control, see for example Geoffard
and Philipson (1997), Gersovitz and Hammer (2004) and Toxvaerdy (2010). However, for a
complex, highly non-linear phenomenon such as contagion, the stochastic model described
above is more appropriate compared to any simple deterministic analog. It is particularly ad-
vantageous in that it is suitable for small populations, it can account for the regional/global
nature of a crisis, while model complexity and realism can be naturally expanded in different
directions, some of which will be discussed below.
Figure 1 illustrates a potential configuration of a crisis spread in the case of a small
population of five countries denoted by {1,2,...,5}. The five countries are partitioned into
two regions, represented by the two circles. Consider 1 as the country originally affected by
the crisis in question. The grey links denote contacts made locally between countries within
a region. The black links correspond to global contacts. The solid directed links represent
contacts that resulted in infection while the dashed links represent lack of contact in both
directions. Thus, in this particular configuration the crisis is transmitted from country 1 to
countries 2 and 4.
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Figure 1: Example of a crisis spead over a small population of countries
In the specification described above the population of countries is assumed to represent a
complete network i.e. any country can have contacts with any other locally and globally. This
is not a restrictive assumption as epidemics upon random networks can be reparameterised to
correspond to epidemics on complete graphs (e.g. Neal, 2006, Newman, 2010), and thus can
be incorporated into the proposed framework. Furthermore, the population is assumed to
be homogeneous, that is, all countries posses similar infectivity and susceptibility properties.
This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.1.1.
Further detail can be added to the model by disaggregating the population according
to individual attributes and/or relationship networks based, for example, on economic in-
formation. These details can be incorporated through the transmission rates leading to
weighted networks. The study of a dynamic process on a weighted network is, essentially,
equivalent to the inclusion of a covariate. This can be easily seen by considering the mo-
ment generating function of the transmission rate, say φ(λ), where φ(λ) = E(exp(−λI)). In
the case of a constant infectious period this is simply exp(−λI), the probability of avoiding
infection. When information about a particular variable, say X, becomes available, this can
be incorporated using a Cox-type (log-linear) model: λ = λ0 exp(αX). Then φ(λ) becomes
φ(λ) = exp[−Iλ0 exp(αX)] = w exp(−λ0I) = wφ(λ0). In other words, the inclusion of co-
variates using the proposed methodology is equivalent to the simultaneous estimation of the
weights on our network. Dealing with multiple covariates (equivalently, weighting based on
more than one variable) is straightforward as will be illustrated in Section 4.2.2. If the focus
is, for example, on the contagious default of banks these covariates could represent balance
sheet information and/or information on interbank relations. In the case of a currency crisis,
they could represent trade and financial linkages between countries. Additional covariates
accounting for macroeconomic conditions could also be included.
6
2.2 Threshold Parameter
An appealing feature of the proposed modelling framework is that it embodies a threshold
parameter which can be utilised as a severity measure of the crisis, thus providing an inherent
control mechanism. Stochastic models such as epidemic and branching processes typically
generate bimodal realisations where an epidemic may or may not die out quickly, depending
on the value of the threshold parameter R0, often referred to as the basic reproduction
number. This is the most important parameter in epidemic theory and is defined as the
expected number of infections generated by a typical infective in an infinite susceptible
population. Generally, in deterministic epidemic models, R0 is calculated as the largest
eigenvalue of the so called next generation matrix (Diekmann and Heesterbeek, 2000).
In the case of a homogeneously mixing stochastic epidemic, it holds that R0 = λE(I),
where λ is the contact rate and I is the infectious period. R0 may be interpreted as a
threshold parameter since its value determines whether or not a major crisis can occur. In
particular, if R0 > 1 a positive proportion of the infinite population will be affected by the
crisis with positive probability, while if R0 ≤ 1 only a finite number of susceptibles will ever
become infected and thus the crisis spread will swiftly die out. Hence, most control measures
aim to reduce R0 below unity. Ball and Donelly (1995) rigorously established the threshold
behaviour of the general stochastic epidemic by coupling the early stages of the epidemic
with a suitable branching process.
For the two-level mixing model the threshold parameter, denoted by R∗, is defined in a
similar way to R0. In this case, Ball et al. (1997) couple the epidemic with a branching
process defined on groups. They show that
R∗ = λGE(I)v(λL), (1)
where v(λL) is the average group final size if only local infections are permitted. Specifically,
v(λL) =
1
g
∑S
j=1 jµjpij , where µj is the final size within a group of size j, pij = rj/r is the
proportion of groups of size j and g is the mean group size. It should be noted that while R∗
is linear in λG, it is nonlinear in λL but linear in v(λL), with the latter being an increasing
function of λL. Details of the calculation of v(λL) can be found in the Supplement.
Most statistical analyses require the assumption of supercriticality, that is R∗ > 1 so
that a major crisis spread is possible (e.g. Rida, 1991; Demiris and O’Neill, 2005b). Since
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prophylactic measures aim to achieve R∗ ≤ 1, assuming that R∗ > 1 is not desirable while
it also results in underestimating the variability of the model parameters. The inference
procedure we will employ does not condition upon R∗ > 1.
2.3 Inference Using Final Outcome Data
2.3.1 Final Size Distribution
For a given crisis episode, when only information on the final infected number of countries is
available, i.e. final outcome data, it is in principle possible to write down a system of recursive
linear equations, the solution of which delivers the probability mass function required for the
likelihood. However, solving such a set of equations can be numerically unstable even for
small population sizes (see for example Andersson and Britton, 2000, p.18). This problem
is greatly amplified for more complex cases like the two level mixing model considered here.
The remainder of this section is concerned with the description of an inference procedure
that surmounts this complication.
2.3.2 Data and Likelihood
For the two level mixing model, the data are of the form x = {xij} where xij denotes the
number of regions containing j initially susceptible countries of which i ever suffered the
crisis in question. We will describe a Bayesian inference procedure for the two infection
rates λL and λG, given x. By Bayes’ Theorem, the posterior density, pi(λL, λG | x), satisfies
pi(λL, λG | x) ∝ pi(x | λL, λG)pi(λL, λG), where pi(x | λL, λG) denotes the likelihood function
and pi(λL, λG) the joint prior of (λL, λG). The numerical problems mentioned in Section 2.3.1
indicate that the likelihood is analytically and numerically intractable for all but a very small
number of countries. We surpass this difficulty by following Demiris and O’Neill (2005a) in
augmenting the parameter space using an appropriate random directed graph (digraph) as
considered below.
2.3.3 Random Digraph
The characterisation of the final outcome of a stochastic epidemic in terms of random graphs
is well known in epidemic theory and has been exploited by Ludwig (1975) and Barbour and
Mollison (1990) among others. It has been considered for the purposes of statistical inference
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by Demiris and O’Neill (2005a); see also O’Neill (2009). In short, let each country correspond
to a vertex in the random digraph with a directed edge denoting a potential infection. The
edges are drawn from vertex j with probability 1 − exp(−IjλL) (1 − exp(−IjλG/N)) for
local (global) links. It then holds that the distribution of the final outcome of the crisis is
equivalent to the distribution of the ‘giant component’ of the graph, that is, the random
set of vertices that are connected to the initially affected country (or countries) through
directed edges. Additional edges may exist in the digraph, but only the routes emanating
from the initially infected can correspond to actual ‘infections’. Flexible models for the
infectious periods Ij such as disjoint intervals in real time, representing for example stock
market opening times in the case of a stock market crash, can be easily incorporated into this
framework as they only appear through the edge probabilities. To maximise computational
efficiency we only consider the graph on ‘infected’ vertices, while all other data contributions
are accounted for through the likelihood.
2.3.4 Augmented Likelihood and Posterior
Suppose that the total number of countries that are ever affected by a particular crisis is
n =
∑
i
∑
j ixij, labeled 1, . . . , n, and defineG as the random digraph on these n vertices. For
j = 1, . . . , n let Ij denote the infectious period corresponding to vertex j and I = (I1, . . . , In).
We assume that initially there is one known country in crisis, although it is trivial to consider
any number of initial infectives, possibly of unknown identity. In fact, it turns out that
knowledge of the initial infective is not crucial in the applications to follow.
The augmented posterior density may be written as
pi(λL, λG, I, G | x) ∝ pi(x | λL, λG, I, G)pi(G | λL, λG, I)pi(I)pi(λL, λG). (2)
In (2), pi(λL, λG) and pi(I) denote the priors while the first two terms effectively represent
the augmented likelihood, given by L(x | λL, λG, I, G). Provided that G is compatible
with the data, L(x | λL, λG, I, G) is evaluated as the probability of the edges in G times
the probability of no edges between the n vertices in G and the remaining N − n vertices.
Otherwise, L(x | λL, λG, I, G) is set to zero.
Let Lj (
G
j ) denote the number of local (global) links emanating from vertex j and N
L
j the
number of countries in region j. Further, let G ∼ x denote the event that G is compatible
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with the data. Then the augmented likelihood can be written as
L(x | λL, λG, I, G) := pi(x | λL, λG, I, G)pi(G | λL, λG, I) = 1G∼x
n∏
j=1
[
{1− exp (−λLIj)}
Lj
exp
(
−λLIj
(
NLj − 
L
j
)){
1− exp
(
−
λGIj
N
)}Gj
exp
(
−
λGIj(N − 
G
j )
N
)]
, (3)
where 1C denotes the indicator function which takes the value of one when the event C
materialises, and zero otherwise. The MCMC algorithm used to sample from (2) is largely
similar to that in Demiris and O’Neill (2005a) where additional details can be found. In
brief, standard random walk Metropolis samplers are sufficient for updating the infection
rates, while updating G requires some attention. Specifically, G is a discrete random object
with an enormous number of possible configurations, the overwhelming majority of which
have negligible posterior probability. Hence, simple strategies like adding and deleting one
edge at a time are preferable, as samplers based on more complex proposals can exhibit poor
convergence.
3 A Hidden Epidemic Model
Thus far, analysis of the proposed model has been discussed for the case where only final
outcome data are available. Next we illustrate how one can obtain additional information
about the propagation of a financial crisis, for example the times of entry to and/or exit from
the crisis, by making use of temporal data. This way a more complete characterisation of the
crisis can be obtained, including its duration for each country. Contrary to a communicable
disease where it is common to observe the times at which individuals developed symptoms
or recovered, this is not typically the case for a financial crisis. The use of temporal data in
the current context necessitates the introduction of a novel hierarchical model that we call
the Hidden Epidemic Model (HEM). The HEM embeds the stochastic financial epidemic as
a latent process that governs the behaviour of the observed temporal variables. One of the
important advantages of inferring the transmission parameters using the hidden epidemic
model is that it can be used for real-time analysis of a financial crisis spread and hence for
the evaluation of prospective immunisation policies. Hierarchical models, specifically Hidden
Markov Models, have been used in the recent literature to analyse contagion, see for example
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Gravelle et al. (2006) and Mandilaras and Bird (2010). However, the focus of these studies
is on detecting contagion with the former focusing on changes in volatilities and the latter
on correlations across different crisis and non-crisis periods. As such, they do not contain
any transmission features associated with the highly complex phenomenon of contagion.
3.1 Model Structure
Consider the observed variable Yit for country i at time t where i = 1, . . . ,N and t = 1, . . . , T .
Let Sit denote the state of country i at time t, andEi andRi the times of entry to and recovery
from the crisis. The state variable Sit is defined as
Sit =

1, t < Ei (susceptible)
2, Ei < t < Ri (infected)
3, t > Ri (recovered).
(4)
For any country i not affected by the crisis Ei = Ri = ∞. Hence, the total final size
l =
∑N
i 1(Ei =∞).
The conditional distribution of Yit|Sit is assumed to follow a Student’s t distribution with
ν degrees of freedom, with mean and variance that depend on Sit in the following manner:
Yit|Sit ∼

tν(µ1, σi1), if Sit = 1,
tν(µ2, σi2), if Sit = 2,
tν(µ3, σi3), if Sit = 3.
The choice of the t distribution was based on preliminary results of the properties of the tem-
poral variable used in the subsequent empirical application. In principle it can be specified as
any distribution. We also make the following assumption which characterises the dependence
structure of the model: Y1t, Y2t, . . . , YNt conditionally on S1t, S2t, . . . , SNt are independent for
any t, i.e., f (Y1t, Y2t, . . . YNt|S1t, S2t, . . . , SNt) = f (Y1t|S1t) f (Y2t|S2t) · · · f (YNt|SNt) , t =
1, . . . T, where f(·) denotes the density function of a Student’s t distribution. That is,
while the state of each country (and thus the log-returns) depends on the state of all other
countries in a complex non-linear stochastic manner, conditional upon the state of the coun-
try we assume independent variation in the log-return Yit. To capture the inherent depen-
dencies involved in the transmission mechanism of a crisis, we model the state variables
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S = (Sit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T ) by the stochastic epidemic two level of mixing model
described in Section 2. As in the standard Hidden Markov Models used in the literature to
identify currency crises, see Martinez-Peria (2002) and Brunetti et al. (2008) among others,
the above specification can be extended to allow for an autoregressive structure in the mean
of the observed series, as well as conditional heteroskedasticity. The latter can be accom-
modated by allowing the volatilities to follow, for example, a standard GARCH form. Such
extensions will not be pursued here.
3.2 Inference
Without loss of generality we assume that µ = 0, for  = 1, 2, 3 as would be reason-
able, for example, in the case of financial (log)return data. We are interested in infer-
ring the parameters governing the crisis transmission, and as a by-product the volatilities
σ = (σi, i = 1, . . . , N ;  = 1, 2, 3) and times of entry to and recovery from the crisis,
E = (E1, . . . , EN) and R = (R1, . . . , RN) respectively.
Augmented Likelihood
Let Y = (Y11, . . . , Y1T ;Y21, . . . , Y2T , . . . ;YN1, . . . , YNT ). The likelihood of the observed data
(Y) given the infection rates λG and λL and the volatilities (σ) can be expressed as
L(Y|λG, λL,σ) =
∫
S
f(Y,S|λG, λL,σ)dS. (5)
If the times of entry to and recovery from the crisis for all the countries in the population
were known, then parameter estimation would be straightforward. This information, how-
ever, is typically not directly observable. In this case, the likelihood given by (5) is intractable
due to the requirement of computing the high dimensional integral
∫
S
(·). To surmount this
problem we augment the parameter space with the sets E and R, and propose a Bayesian
data-augmentation framework for estimation (see, for example, O’Neill and Roberts, 1999).
This approach will enable us to treat the times Ei, Ri, i = 1, . . .N as additional parameters
to be estimated simultaneously with λL, λG and σ.
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Posterior Distribution
The posterior distribution of the unknown parameters of interest given the observed data
and assuming independent priors for λL, λG and σ, is expressed as
pi(λG, λL,σ,E,R|Y) ∝ pi(Y|E,R,σ, λG, λL)pi(E,R|σ, λL, λG)pi(σ, λL, λG)
= pi(Y|E,R,σ)pi(E,R|λL, λG)pi(σ)pi(λG)pi(λL), (6)
where pi(Y|E,R,σ) =
∏N
i=1
∏T
t=1 f(Yit|Sit).
The second term in (6) is the contribution from the epidemic model and following, for
example, Jewell et al. (2009) is given by
pi(E,R|λL, λG) ∝
(∏
j =k
Mj
)
× exp
{
−
∫ T
Ek
∑
i,j
µij(t) dt
}
× R, (7)
where Mj denotes the (infectious) pressure that an infected country is subjected to just
before it enters the crisis. Thus we have that Mj =
∑
i∈C µij where µij is the instantaneous
rate at which country i exerts (infectious) pressure on country j just before country j enters
the crisis with µij =
λG
N
+λL1(i,j in the same region). The set C denotes the set of countries affected
by the crisis at time t. The country that first entered the crisis is labelled by k and T is the
time at which the crisis is assumed to be over.
The term R in (7) denotes the contribution of the recovery process to the likelihood of
the epidemic model. Assuming independent (random) infectious periods Ii, i = 1, . . . , n,
this contribution is R =
∏n
i=1 fI(Ii), where fI(·) denotes the arbitrarily specified distribu-
tion governing the infectious period. The infectious periods are assumed to be distributed
according to a Gamma distribution with (hyper) parameters γ and δ (and mean γ/δ), so
then R =
∏n
i=1
δγ
Γ(γ)
Iγ−1i exp{−Iiδ}.
Priors
The terms pi(σ), pi(λG) and pi(λL) denote the prior distributions assigned to the parameters
σ, λL and λG respectively. Slowly varying exponential priors are assigned to λL and λG
and Inverse-Gamma distributions are assigned to the volatilities. If the parameters asso-
ciated with the infectious period distributions, γ and δ, are assumed to be unknown then
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prior distributions need to also be assigned to these. An obvious choice for weakly infor-
mative priors would be to assume that both parameters are a-priori independent and follow
exponential priors similar to λL, λG. As we do not make any assumption about which coun-
try entered the crisis first, we consider a joint prior distribution for k and Ek as follows:
pi(k, Ek) = pi(Ek|k)pi(k) with pi(k) = 1/|C| where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set and
pi(Ek|k) ≡ U(−∞, Rk).
3.3 Incorporating Additional Covariates
Explanatory variables are, in principle, straightforward to incorporate within a HEM through
the transmission rates. In the most general case one can allow for different covariates affecting
local and global rates as follows:
λL,ij = λL0 exp(
∑
k αLkXL,ijk), λG,ij = λG0 exp(
∑
k αGkXG,ijk),
where λL,ij is the local crisis trasmission rate from the infected country i to the susceptible
country j, λL0 is the local baseline transmission rate, XL,ij = (XL,ij1, ..., XL,ijK) are the
covariates of interest, and αL = (αL1, ..., αLK) are the associated coefficients; similarly for
the global counterparts. An example of a covariate, XL,ijk (XG,ijk) could be the exports
from country i to country j, at the local (global) level or some proxy for financial linkages
as will be considered in our empirical application. It is then of interest to infer the effect of
the different covariates on the transmission rates by estimating the parameters αL and αG.
This will allow to evaluate the importance of different channels in the propagation of a crisis
across countries. Note that for αL = αG = 0, the baseline hidden epidemic model with two
levels of mixing is recovered. The posterior distribution of interest then becomes
pi(λG, λL,αL,αG,σ,E,R|Y) = pi(Y|E,R,σ)pi(E,R|λL, λG)
× pi(σ)pi(λG)pi(λL)pi(αL)pi(αG). (8)
We employ a Metropolis-within-Gibbs algorithm to draw samples from the posterior
distribution given by (8). Apart from the volatilities which are updated using a Gibbs
sampler, all the other parameters in the model, including the times of entry to and exit
from the crisis, are updated using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with Gaussian proposal
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distributions.
Remark 1 Unlike when only final size data are available where the SIR model is invariant to
a latent period, this is not true for temporal data. A straightforward extension to consider in
the latter case is a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model which assumes that
once a country enters the crisis state, it can only trasmit the crisis (i.e. become infective)
after a certain time period elapses.
Remark 2 In the case of real-time analysis, the methodology can be extended to conduct
inference for the countries more likely to enter the crisis, given the current state of the
process. For this purpose, a trans-dimensional MCMC algorithm (Green, 1995) is required
which accounts for the variable dimension of the parameter space.
Remark 3 A threshold parameter similar to R (see Section 2.2) can also be defined for the
hidden epidemic model, taking into account any additional covariate information. In this
case, definitions of typical infective and susceptible countries based upon averaging over their
covariate values could be used for inclusion in the v(λL) term in (1).
4 Empirical Application
To illustrate the proposed methodology we analyse the contagious spead of five currency
crisis episodes considered by Glick and Rose (1999), namely the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods System, 1971, the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement, 1973, the EMS Crisis,
1992, the Mexican meltdown and Tequila Effect, 1994, and the Asian Flu, 1997. Caution is
required when interpreting the results for the 1973 episode, as this date coincides with the
oil crisis of the same year, and may not be entirely appropriate as an example of contagion.
However, we decided to include it in our analysis for illustrative purposes. The final outcome
dataset is compiled from the cross-sectional binary data of Glick and Rose for 160 developed
and developing countries, where a country that ultimately experienced the crisis in question
takes the value of one and zero otherwise. Our choice to analyse currency crises was primarily
driven by the evidence of contagion associated with these crises as reported in the literature.
Glick and Rose identify the binary crisis variable from journalistic and academic histories of
the various crisis episodes. An alternative approach of constructing the binary crisis indicator
relies on some pre-selected crisis-identification threshold, which transforms a continuous
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variable or combination of variables into the desired indicator. See Jacobs et al. (2005) for
a review of the literature on identification of crises.
We begin our analysis by dividing the countries into groups based on geographical loca-
tion. A detailed list of the countries and the composition of regions, as well as the countries
affected by each of the crisis episodes can be found in Tables A1 and A2 respectively in
the Appendix. The regional decomposition is based on the United Nations classification.
Alternative population structures such as overlapping groups or networks based on the trade
pattern, financial links or macroeconomic similarities between countries could also be consid-
ered. Linkages of this type will be incorporated in what follows through the use of covariates
as discussed in Section 3.3.
4.1 Final Size Data
In what follows we present posterior summary estimates of the local (λL) and global (λG)
trasmission rates for each of the five currency crisis episodes. Since no information is available
in final outcome data regarding the mean length of the period for which a country remains in
crisis, we set the infectious period distribution in advance of the data analysis. This should
be taken into account when interpreting λL and λG, while R∗ will not be affected as can be
seen from equation (1). In the results that follow, without loss of generality the infectious
period is set to unity. Slowly varying exponential distributions with rate 0.01 are used as
priors.
The results, summarised in Table 1, give the mean posterior estimates and corresponding
95% credible intervals for the local and global contact rates, as well as the ratio of global
(between region) to total (within region) per-country contact rate λG/N
λL+λG/N
= λG
NλL+λG
, for
each crisis episode. Since the infectious period is set to unity, this ratio also represents the
ratio of between to within country-to-country infectious contacts. The results indicate an
increase in the global trasmission rate over time across the different currency crises with a
simultaneous decrease observed in the local rate. This is particularly apparent from the ratio
λG
NλL+λG
, which is very small for the crises of the seventies and increases to almost a half in
the case of the 1997 crisis, with the length of the corresponding intervals also increasing.
The shift from local to global spread over time potentially reflects the significant increase of
global financial linkages across countries in recent decades. While empirical evidence in the
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literature suggests that currency crises tend to be mostly regional, only a model allowing
for both local and global effects can truly assess the relative importance of each of these
dimensions in the transmission of crises. However, it must be pointed out that while the
1992 crisis was mainly confined to European countries, the results in Table 1 do not bring
out such a feature. Indeed, a further refinement of the analysis is required to shed light on
the true nature of the EMS crisis episode. This will be undertaken in Section 4.1.1 where
we consider including categorical covariates in the analysis reflecting certain characteristics
of the countries involved.
Table 1: Posterior summary estimates for the two-level mixing model
Crisis Episode λL λG
λG
NλL+λG
1971 0.445(0.239,0.738) 0.297(0.093,0.618) 0.005(0.001,0.013)
1973 0.349(0.164,0.574) 0.446(0.169,0.868) 0.010(0.003,0.027)
1992 0.018(0.000,0.066) 1.019(0.487,1.731) 0.381(0.073,0.932)
1994 0.013(0.000,0.047) 1.043(0.516,1.777) 0.456(0.102,0.955)
1997 0.011(0.000,0.041) 1.068(0.617,1.616) 0.491(0.127,0.958)
The above results were obtained using the MCMC algorithm described in Section 2.3.4.
The computational complexity is mainly determined by the size of the random graph. The
small final sizes involved in this application imply highly efficient computations, that is
approximate running times of 2-3 minutes per 106 iterations. An additional attractive feature
of the considered methodology is related to the convergence of the algorithm. Specifically,
it is possible to create a measure of approximate monotonicity by considering summary
measures of the random graph such as the total number of links. In the case of a homogeneous
population (GSE) and constant infectious period the number of links can be thought of as a
sufficient statistic; in more general models it is approximately sufficient. Hence, this number
can be used as an approximate convergence diagnostic of the MCMC algorithm. For all the
reported results we started the algorithm from the two ‘extremes’ in the graph space, that
is, a complete graph where all countries have local and global links with all others, and a
sparse tree-like graph. Rapid convergence towards the ‘high probability’ region was observed
for all the algorithm implementations. This region lies between the two extremes, with the
‘likely’ graphs being of relatively sparse form.
Additional information from the graph output can also be obtained if required. An
empirical measure of the longest path and the number of generations can easily be extracted
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from the digraph. Combined with knowledge relating to the duration of the crisis, this would
deliver inference for the time-length of each generation of affected countries. Theoretical
bounds for the longest path in the case of a homogeneous random digraph have been derived
in Foss and Konstantopoulos (2003).
4.1.1 Multitype Processes
Motivated by the evidence that crises in developing economies are of a different nature than
those in developed ones (Kaminsky, 2006), we consider further partitioning our population
of countries into developed and developing, based on the world factbook IMF classification.
This distinction allows for the possibility of these two groupings having different local and/or
global rates, rather than assuming equal susceptibility and infectivity rates across all coun-
tries. It therefore enables to distinguish whether a particular crisis episode affected mostly
developed and/or developing countries, avoiding potential misjudgement that may arise from
overlooking the degree of economic development of the countries under study. In addition,
an analysis that considers a population of multiple types can be useful in uncovering impor-
tant transmission channels that may go unobserved in the context of a single type model,
as will become clear in what follows. This kind of extension essentially involves introducing
categorical covariates into our model specification that can be handled using multitype epi-
demic models. Table 2 below gives the proportions of the affected developed and developing
countries across the different crisis episodes.
Table 2: Proportions of affected countries across the different crisis episodes
Crisis Episodes 1971 1973 1992 1994 1997
Developed 19
28
19
28
10
29
2
29
4
29
Developing 0
113
0
113
0
130
9
131
13
131
Consider the case of the 1992 EMS crisis where 10 out of 29 developed countries were affected,
while no developing country suffered the crisis in question. Moreover, all affected countries
were in Europe (see Table A2 in the Appendix) so we would expect a high local transmission
rate among developed countries, which could not have been deduced from Table 1.
We consider a two type, two level mixing stochastic epidemic model to characterise the
spread of crises among developed and developing countries. Multitype analysis involves a
further decomposition of the local and global rates relative to the single type framework,
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reflecting the data provided in Table 2. To see this let ΛL = {λij,L} and ΛG = {λij,G},
i, j = 1, 2, denote the 2 × 2 matrices of local and global infectious rates, respectively.
Subscript 1 (2) refers to the developed (developing) countries, so that for example λ12,L
denotes the local rate at which the crisis affecting a developed country is transmitted to
a developing country. It is evident that the number of infection rates to be estimated has
now increased considerably relative to the single type model. Certain modelling restrictions
are therefore necessary for identifiability, unavoidably for the λG’s and possibly for the λL’s
depending on the dataset under consideration, see Britton (1998) and Britton and Becker
(2000) for a detailed discussion.
We consider the following restriction: we allow for distinct local rates when the data
contain sufficiently rich information for identification purposes. This is not always the case.
Based on the data provided in Table 2, for the earlier crises of 1971, 1973 and 1992 no
developing countries were affected. Hence, the data contain no information with respect to
the local and global transmission of these crises from one developing country to another, that
is λ22,L and λ22,G, respectively, and hence results will be largely informed by the prior. In
addition, convergence of the MCMC sampler may be problematic so special care is required
in efforts to overcome issues of parameter redundancy. In such cases, for the local rates
we assume equal susceptibility and distinct infectivity, which implies λ11,L = λ21,L, and
λ12,L = λ22,L, that is developed countries have different potential in transmitting the crisis
compared to developing ones, while all countries are equally susceptible. Globally, it is
well known (e.g. Ball et al., 2004) that at most two transmission rates are identifiable.
Thus, in keeping with our local assumptions, we assume common global susceptibility to a
crisis, but distinct global infectivity. We consider this choice to be reasonable within the
present context. Scenarios with alternative susceptibility levels, potentially defined based on
economic information, are also possible. In fact, within our Bayesian framework it is possible
to consider any structure for ΛL and ΛG subject to the required identifiability restrictions.
We begin by presenting in Table 3 the posterior means and standard deviations of the
two type model when equal local and global vulnerability is considered for all crisis episodes.
For the earlier crises of 1971, 1973 and 1992, both local and global rates are smaller for the
developing countries compared to the developed countries. The results are less homogeneous
for the later crises and largely reflect their relative severity, with the developing countries
being generally more affected, especially globally.
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Table 3: Posterior summaries (means and standard deviations) for the two type model with
equal local and global vulnerability for each grouping
Crisis Episode ΛL =
(
λ11,L λ12,L
λ21,L λ22,L
)
ΛG =
(
λ11,G λ12,G
λ21,G λ22,G
)
1971 0.475(0.211) 0.091(0.089) 0.761(0.356) 0.053(0.053)
1973 0.284(0.130) 0.075(0.076) 1.028(0.417) 0.054(0.053)
1992 0.170(0.086) 0.037(0.037) 0.645(0.390) 0.100(0.099)
1994 0.115(0.093) 0.065(0.032) 0.194(0.135) 0.559(0.238)
1997 1.017(0.394) 0.070(0.030) 0.138(0.098) 0.454(0.186)
Note: The matrix ΛL (ΛG) contains the local (global) estimated trasmission rates, where subscripts 1 and 2
refer to the developed and developing countries, respectively. Standard deviations are reported in brackets.
The restrictions λ11,L = λ21,L and λ12,L = λ22,L are imposed on ΛL, and λ11,G = λ21,G and λ12,G = λ22,G
are imposed on ΛG.
Table 4 presents results under distinct local and equal global vulnerability. Results for
this case are only reported for the more recent crises, 1994 and 1997, owing to the lack of
information in identifying the local transmission rate, λ22,L, as explained earlier. For both
these episodes, allowing for distinct local susceptibility shows that the local transmission of
the crisis is largely from developing to developed countries, as would be expected from the
ratios reported in Table 2. A reasonably high local transmission rate is also observed between
developed countries. Transmission rates at the global level are similar to those reported in
Table 3.
Table 4: Posterior summaries (means and standard deviations) for the two type model with
distinct local and equal global vulnerability for each grouping
Crisis Episode ΛL =
(
λ11,L λ12,L
λ21,L λ22,L
)
ΛG =
(
λ11,G λ12,G
λ21,G λ22,G
)
1994 0.299(0.235) 0.264(0.262) 0.191(0.137) 0.567(0.251)
0.657(0.317) 0.070(0.035) 0.191(0.137) 0.567(0.251)
1997 0.366(0.183) 0.189(0.153) 0.147(0.103) 0.450(0.185)
0.924(0.325) 0.064(0.036) 0.147(0.103) 0.450(0.185)
Note: The matrix ΛL (ΛG) contains the local (global) estimated trasmission rates, where subscripts 1 and 2
refer to the developed and developing countries, respectively. Standard deviations are reported in brackets.
The restrictions λ11,G = λ21,G and λ12,G = λ22,G are imposed on ΛG.
4.2 Temporal Data
We follow the definition of a currency crisis by Frankel and Rose (1996), namely a successful
speculative attack that manifests itself through a large nominal depreciation of the currency.
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As such, we consider daily log changes in nominal exchange rates as our observed data, that
can be used to estimate the entry to and exit from the crisis, in addition to the transmission
rates and volatility parameter. To capture the well documented importance of trade and
financial linkages in the spread of contagious currency crises, we include related variables as
covariates in the hidden epidemic model. Since the relative importance of the trasmission
rates has already been extensively discussed, our focus will be on assessing the significance
of these covariates.
4.2.1 Exchange Rates
We use daily log exchange rate returns for those countries affected by the crisis, for each
crisis episode. While in principle exchange rate data should be considered for all countries
in the sample, we proceed by making use of the knowledge of those countries that were
affected by the crisis for consistency with the analysis in Section 4.1. The Deutsche Mark is
used as the reference currency for the 1992 episode, given that this was the anchor currency
within the European Monetary System at the time, and the US dollar for the 1994 and 1997
crises. The returns were originally computed over a five year window, including two years
preceding and two years following the crisis year. However, to avoid overlapping crises, the
final estimation samples were chosen as, 01/01/1990-15/03/1994, 16/03/1994-31/12/1996,
and 01/01/1997-13/03/1998 for the 1992, 1994, and 1997 crises, respectively. Further details
regarding the data are available in the Supplement. Among the infected countries for the
1994 and 1997 crises, Argentina and Hong Kong maintained an exchange rate peg and were
therefore excluded from the sample for the purpose of the HEM analysis.
4.2.2 Covariates
Trade routes of contagion in the empirical literature typically rely on direct and indirect
measures of trade based on exports. Financial routes focus primarily on bank lending chan-
nels and in particular the ‘common lender effect’. The common lender effect argues that a
country that relies on the same source of financing as a crisis country (being highly indebted
to the same lender, as well as being highly represented in the lender’s portfolio) can increase
the country’s financial vulnerability. A loss or underperforming loans in a country in crisis
induces international creditors to reduce the amount of the loan and withdraw their financial
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assets from other countries. Countries affected by a crisis rely heavily on borrowings from
the common lender. About 10% or more of the common bank liabilities are normally held
in an infected country (Caramazza et al. 2004). We consider trade covariates for the 1992,
1994 and 1997 crisis episodes. Financial covariates are considered only for the latter two,
due to data non-availability. The crises of the seventies are excluded from the analysis for
the same reason.
Trade Covariates Glick and Rose (1999) consider a number of aggregate measures of
direct and indirect trade, centered on the ground zero (initial infective) country and focusing
exclusively on exports. These and other similar measures are considered in a number of
studies, for example Van Rijcheghem and Weder (2001), Dasgupta et al. (2011), and Haile
and Pozo (2008), that use probit type models.
We use the disaggregate matrix of bilateral trade relationships between the infected
countries and all trading partners directly in our model. To adjust for the varying size of
countries in our sample we consider trade shares, constructed as the ratio of bilateral trade
between the infected country i and each of its trading partners j within the total trade
of country i. Specifically, we consider two sets of trade covariates, one based exclusively
on annual export figures from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the other
based on the average of import and export figures. The latter allows to assess the importance
of imports, which is ignored in the analysis of Glick and Rose (1999) as they admittedly point
out.
Both trade covariates are based on annual figures averaged across the three years typically
immediately preceding each crisis episode. See the supplement for more details. Countries
where data for more than 20% of trading activity were not available were dropped from the
sample for each crisis episode. This resulted in sample sizes of 99, 107, 106 countries for the
1992, 1994 and 1997 crises, respectively, for exports only, and 124, 133 and 132, respectively,
for imports and exports. For the purpose of sensitivity analysis we further excluded countries
where more than 30% of trading activity was not available and the results were very similar.
We model the instantaneous rate at which country i exerts (infectious) pressure on coun-
try j, just before country j enters the crisis as µij =
(
λG
N
+ λL1(i,j in the same region)
)
×
eαXij , where Xij denotes the acting trade covariate, that is the trade share matrix of the in-
fected countries with all countries in the sample, α is the corresponding covariate effect, and
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λL, λG denote the local and global transmission rates, respectively. Although in principle
one could use a more general model and allow the covariate Xij to separately affect the local
and global rates, as discussed in Section 3.3, we opted for a simpler model in the interest
of parsimony. We assign a Gaussian prior with large variance to the parameter α as for all
covariate effects in the illustrations that follow.
For a given infected country, the stronger its trade linkages with the other countries the
higher the rate of transmitting the crisis to these countries, other things being equal. This
interpretation is different from that of Glick and Rose (1999) and other authors who focus
on the effect of trade on the probability of a country becoming infected, rather than on
the probability of the infected country transmitting the crisis to other countries. In our
context, the former probability can be evaluated as a function of the transmission rates and
the infectious pressure exerted on that country.
Table 5 reports the mean and median posterior estimates, and the 90% credible intervals,
for the coefficient of the trade covariate across the different crises, in the case of imports
and exports, and exports only. For the 1992 crisis episode, a significant amount of the
probability mass of the posterior distributions is concentrated around positive values of the
trade coefficient, while for the 1994 and 1997 crises a significant amount of probability mass
is associated with negative values (see the Supplement for graphs of the posterior densities).
A negative coefficient implies that trade confers a ‘protective’ effect against the spread of
these crises. This is not counterintuitive after inspecting the percentage of trade among the
infected countries for each crisis episode given in Table A3 in the Appendix. The figures
show that, for the 1994 and 1997 crises, trading activity (based on imports and exports)
among infected countries is smaller than that between infected countries and their non-
infected trading partners. For the 1992 crisis, trading activity among infected countries is
much higher. Similar figures are observed in the case of exports only (results not shown).
According to these results trade, whether based on imports and exports or on exports only,
appears to be a statistically significant channel in the transmission of the 1994 currency
crisis. There is no such evidence in the case of the 1992 and 1997 crises.
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Table 5: Posterior summary estimates for the coefficient of the trade covariates
1992 1994 1997
Imports and Exports
Mean 6.19 -30.95 -4.07
Median 6.32 -25.15 -3.02
90% CI (-1.66,13.94) (-74.52,-2.08) (-17.16,5.13)
Exports
Mean 8.51 -48.87 -9.17
Median 8.36 -36.53 -4.76
90% CI (-0.85,18.09) (-125.43,-1.95) (-38.48,5.10)
Financial Covariates Financial covariates for the 1994 and 1997 crises are constructed
based on two sets of bi-annual banking data from the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) beginning in 1988, namely international lending from the international consolidated
statistics and international borrowing from the locational international banking statistics.
As in the case of trade, we constructed three year averages based on those years typically
immediately preceding the crisis date. This resulted in 124 and 136 countries for the 1994
and 1997 crisis, respectively. We employ three commonly used measures for financial linkages
between the common lender and crisis countries which are described below (see among others
Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001, Caramazza et al., 2004, Dasgupta et al., 2011 and Haile
and Pozo, 2008). USA and Japan are the common lenders for the 1994 and 1997 crises,
respectively.
(i) A measure of the importance of the common lender to the crisis country, that is the
proportion of borrowing from a common lender, given by F1i = bi,c/bi, where bi,c is total
borrowing of country i from the common lender c and bi is total borrowing of country i.
(ii) A measure of the importance of an affected country to a common lender, that is the
proportion of borrowings of an affected country in the lending portfolio of a common lender,
expressed as F2i = li,c/lc, where li,c is lending of a common lender to country i and lc is total
lending of a common lender.
(iii) A measure of competition for funds, that is the extent to which country i competes
for borrowings from the same common lender as the ground zero country, given by
FCi =
∑
c
x0,c + xi,c
x0 + xi
(
1−
|xi,c − x0,c|
xi,c + x0,c
)
, (9)
where 0 denotes the ground zero country, c is the common lender, xi,c is total lending from
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the common lender to county i, and xi is total borrowings of country i. The higher the value
of FCi, the greater the competition for funds between countries i and 0.
The transmission rate from an ‘infectious’ country i to a ‘susceptible’ country j, µij,
is given by µij =
(
λG
N
+ λL1(i,j in the same region)
)
× eαZi, where Zi denotes the acting
financial covariate either F1, F2, or FC, and α the associated coefficient.
Table 6 reports the mean, median and 90% credible interval for the posterior distribution
of the coefficient α associated with the different financial covariates, for the 1994 and 1997
crises. These coefficients appear to be largely negative as would be expected. For a given
infected country, the greater the proportion of borrowing from a common lender (F1) or in
the lending portfolio of a common lender (F2) the more ‘protected’ that country becomes
and so the smaller the probability of transmitting the crisis to other countries. The results
point to a significant role for the common lender effect in the 1994 crisis, when measured by
the F1 covariate.
Table 6: Posterior summary estimates for the coefficient of the various financial covariates
1994 1997
Mean Median 90% CI Mean Median 90% CI
F1 -14.14 -13.10 (-30.75,-0.99) -0.72 -0.16 (-8.89,4.94)
F2 -15.40 -13.60 (-39.93,4.63) -9.73 -5.91 (-34.33,5.50)
FC -7.98 -7.53 (-19.94,2.66) -2.10 -0.35 (-15.71,4.77)
Trade and Financial Covariates Next we consider including both trade and financial
covariates together in the model so that we have µij =
(
λG
N
+ λL1(i,j in the same region)
)
×
eα1Xij+α2Zi, where Xij and Zi denote the acting trade and financial covariates defined as
above, with α1 and α2 being the corresponding effects.
When both trade and financial covariates are included in the model simultaneously, the
posterior distributions are wider, as confirmed by the posterior estimates and associated
credible intervals presented in Table 7. This table shows the estimates for the posterior
distributions of each pair of coefficients, α1 and α2, associated with the corresponding trade
and financial covariate. Trade refers to the trade shares computed based on the average
of imports and exports. The results based on exports only were qualitatively similar. The
results indicate that, as in the case where a financial covariate only is included in the model,
the common lender effect continues to be significant in the 1994 crisis, not only when mea-
sured as the proportion of borrowing of an affected country from the common lender, F1,
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but also as the proportion of borrowings of an affected country in the lending portfolio of
the common lender, F2. This result appears to overshadow the significant effect found for
the trade channel in the 1994 crisis, when only a trade covariate is included in the model.
No significant effect is observed for the 1997 crisis, in line with the earlier findings.
Table 7: Posterior summary estimates for the coefficients associated with the trade and
financial covariates
1994 1997
Mean Median 90% CI Mean Median 90% CI
Trade -26.83 -18.30 (-85.96,2.35) 5.13 5.96 (-7.87,14.95)
F1 -15.87 -13.81 (-36.75,-2.70) 0.16 0.81 (-6.64,5.09)
Trade -34.05 -25.62 (-98.49,0.94) 1.73 3.59 (-16.87,13.16)
F2 -53.03 -39.47 (-152.13,-1.00) -14.56 -4.84 (-60.24,7.22)
Trade -23.18 -17.97 (-59.28,0.37) 3.51 4.86 (-10.50,13.76)
FC -10.45 -8.95 (-27.90,0.85) -2.25 -1.16 (-12.80,4.26)
Note: Trade refers to the shares of the average of imports and exports.
5 Policy Relevance
Understanding how financial crises spread, through models such as the one proposed here,
can enhance in the design and evaluation of immunisation policies to reduce the risks and
manage the impact of contagion. So far, at the domestic level, the need for policies aimed at
reducing financial fragility has been emphasised; at the international level, the role of better
financial standards and of the international lender of last resort has been discussed, see
Chang and Majnoni (2001). The latter can provide liquidity to crisis countries to withstand
pressures of contagion, as witnessed in the recent economic crises, in the form of rescue
packages.
Among the questions increasingly raised on the policy front are how severe is a particular
crisis and how to distribute the available resources to sustain countries that have experienced
or may be experiencing negative outcomes (how many and which countries to support). The
proposed approach can offer answers to such questions, as we illustrate below, by drawing
on the past experience of the five currency crises episodes analysed earlier. Lessons from
these episodes can offer valuable insight to policy makers for future difficulties.
A number of immunisation policies have been developed, mostly with reference to epi-
demics among humans or animals (Anderson and May, 1991), though examples exist in other
fields like computer science (Balthrop et al., 2004). The threshold theorem described in Sec-
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tion 2.2 provides a natural formulation for evaluating this kind of strategies. In particular,
having obtained the parameter estimates of our model, that is the local and global trans-
mission rates, we can compute the severity measure R∗ given by (1) for the individual crisis
episodes. Recall that if R∗ > 1 a large number of countries will suffer from the crisis in
question with positive probability, while if R∗ ≤ 1 only a small number of susceptible coun-
tries will ever be affected. Control measures, therefore, typically aim to reduce R∗ below
unity with high probability, which we set to 0.95 in the results that follow. The situation
where a major ‘outbreak’ is unlikely to occur is often referred to as ‘herd immunity’. Having
computed R∗ we can then sample from its posterior density, and estimate the percentage (or
number) of countries to support, denoted by pv, in order to prevent a major crisis. In other
words, we will estimate the smallest pv such that P (R∗ < 1) = 0.95.
We will examine here a simple support strategy where the countries to be supported
are chosen uniformly at random. Recall that the threshold parameter without support is
given by R∗ =
λGE(I)
ν
∑
j jµjpij. When a proportion pv of the countries receives support
the threshold reduces to R∗(pv) =
λGE(I)
ν
∑
j jµj
∑
z≥j pir
(
z
j
)
(1−pv)
jpz−jv , since the number
of countries prone to the crisis reduces. The percentage pv is computed as the solution to
the equation R∗(pv) = 1. Thus, pv and R∗ are non-linear functionals of the basic model
parameters, at least when the population structure is non-random and known. Inference
for this type of functionals has been considered for two level mixing models in Britton and
Becker (2000) assuming for simplicity that the outcome within each region is independent
of the fate of other regions. Ball et al. (2004) also consider estimating R∗ and pv using
asymptotic arguments and assuming R∗ > 1. The methods considered in this paper are free
from these assumptions. Moreover, assuming R∗ > 1 is not particularly satisfactory in our
examples, as will soon become apparent. Alternative support policies, like supporting whole
regions chosen at random, are also possible, in which case pv = 1− 1/R∗, a well known result
in epidemic theory, see for example Anderson and May (1982), and Ball and Lyne (2006) for
the case of structured stochastic models. In the subsequent results we assume that financial
support to a country confers complete protection from the crisis, or at least it effectively
prevents a particular country from becoming affected.
Table 8 gives estimates of the posterior mean of R∗, P (R∗ < 1) and pv. A graph of the
posterior distribution of R∗ for all crisis episodes can be found in the supplement. The mean
posterior estimate for R∗ is greater than one for all episodes. In particular, the posterior
27
mean of the 1971 and 1973 crises is 2.19 and 2.95 respectively, while that of the nineties
crises is around 1.2. These results corroborate our earlier empirical findings relating to
the increasing importance of λG, which is now reflected in the decreasing length of the 95%
credible intervals for R∗. The corresponding probability of a crisis being subcritical (‘minor’),
given under the heading P (R∗ < 1), is smaller for the earlier crises compared to the later. In
accordance, the associated percentage, pv, of countries to support in order to avoid a major
crisis with a 0.95 probability decreases over time as noted by the figures in the last column.
The results suggest that the crises of the seventies were of greater severity compared to those
of the nineties.
Table 8: Estimated control measures for the various crisis episodes
Crisis Episode R∗ P (R∗< 1) pv
1971 2.186(0.674,4.610) 0.094 0.291(0.034,0.523)
1973 2.946(0.602,3.632) 0.115 0.265(0.029,0.513)
1992 1.242(0.525,2.425) 0.325 0.240(0.016,0.508)
1994 1.194(0.568,2.170) 0.356 0.230(0.015,0.504)
1997 1.200(0.665,1.938) 0.293 0.210(0.011,0.443)
Note: R∗ measures the severity of the crisis, P (R∗ < 1) is the probability that only subcritical (‘minor’)
crises can occur and pv is the critical protection coverage i.e. the percentage of countries to support in order
to avoid a major crisis with a 0.95 probability. Figures in parentheses are the 95% credibles intervals.
The threshold parameter R∗ and associated control measures are also available in the
multitype context, though the calculations are somewhat more involving. In the two type
case, R∗ is defined as the largest eigenvalue of a matrixM = {mij}, i, j = 1, 2, where, crudely
speaking, m12 describes the mean number of contacts from countries of type 1 (developed) to
countries of type 2 (developing). More details regarding the computation of the mij elements
can be found in the Supplement.
In addition to the support policy considered above, alternative policies can be imple-
mented that provide partial coverage to more countries as opposed to offering complete
protection to a smaller number. This approach is more involved and additional optimisation
techniques are required. It should be noted that if the local transmission rate is small, as
may be the case in a globalised economy, there will not be a significant difference between the
various adopted policies, at least for homogeneous individuals. Britton and Becker (2000)
consider immunisation strategies within a simpler model allowing the level of susceptibility
to the crisis to vary among individuals. Such extensions can be naturally accommodated
within the framework of multitype epidemics discussed earlier.
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As demonstrated from the above analysis, the proposed methodology offers a set of
valuable control measures that can be used to analyse contagious financial crises. When
implemented in real-time, preliminary estimates of the control measures can be computed to
evaluate prospective immunisation policies and reduce the countries’ vulnerability to inter-
national contagion, see Fraser et al. (2009) for a recent example related to the 2009 influenza
pandemic.
6 Discussion
Crises have been a recurrent feature of financial markets for a long time, though it was
primarily the crises of the nineties that sparked increased interest in the study of their
dynamics and propagation. The experience of the recent crises has rekindled such interest,
emphasising the complexity of the financial system, and the need for a better understanding
and monitoring of systemic risk and contagious effects.
This paper proposed a modelling framework to analyse financial contagion based on
a stochastic epidemic process. The proposed approach directly accounts for the inherent
dependencies involved in the propagation of financial crises. In particular, it allows for local
and global transmissions through direct and indirect links to the originally affected country.
Perhaps more importantly, the framework provides an implicit control mechanism, which
includes a canonical measure of the crisis severity along with an estimate of the number of
countries to financially support, in order to prevent a major crisis.
The suggested framework is general in nature, in that it can be applied to any contagious
financial crisis not only as a way to learn from past experiences, but also as the crisis
unfolds, enabling the evaluation of prospective immunisation policies. At the same time the
approach is flexible, as it allows to incorporate features that reflect relevant theoretical and
empirical evidence in the literature through the inclusion of appropriate covariates. Another
notable feature is that it is simple enough to be amenable to model analysis and statistical
inference procedures. This is in contrast to more complex stochastic models which are
typically explored through simulations. Relating the latter to real data is far from trivial,
unless simplifying assumptions are considered. It should be recognised, however, that the
assessment of epidemic model fit is not a trivial matter. This is partly due to the bimodal
realisations of such model outcomes. In the preceding application, we performed an informal
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assessment by simulating 1000 epidemics from the estimated posterior predictive distribution
of the stochastic epidemic two level mixing model for each crisis episode. The results showed
larger outbreaks for the seventies and smaller epidemics for the nineties, indicating reasonable
model fit.
In addition, the suggested framework naturally caters for temporal data, through the use
of the proposed novel hidden epidemic model, contrary to the percolation-based approach.
From a methodological viewpoint, it also has several appealing features. It dispenses with
approximations such as infinite population, independent regions or supercriticality as is often
assumed in epidemic modelling. Moreover, the proposed approach enables one to obtain
additional information relating to the propagation of a crisis, not discussed thus far. This
includes the set of potential infectors and their corresponding probabilities. The estimation
of such crisis characteristics will be more precise in the case of temporal data. Inference
regarding ‘the most likely path’ of the crisis spread can also be conducted, resulting in a
set of the most probable pathways and their corresponding probabilities. Related work is
presented in Shah and Zaman (2011). On the control side, an estimated cost can be assigned
to each country and the total cost of the crisis in question can be calculated.
Further extensions can also be accommodated. The present set-up assumes a-priori in-
dependence of the recovery mechanism across countries, i.e. independent infectious periods.
This can be relaxed and alternative processes can be incorporated into the framework, tai-
lored to the application under consideration. A simple autoregressive structure could be
a reasonable starting point to characterise the potential dependence of infectious periods.
More involved density-dependent processes, can also be considered. For example, the model
could be combined with models for the spread of rumours. The latter are similar to epi-
demic models but the stifling (recovery) of an individual depends on the recovery of others.
In fact, within the economics literature, rumour models have proved useful in the study
of the effects of diffusion of beliefs on market outcomes, see Banerjee (1993) and Kosfeld
(2005). However, the use of classical rumour models alone (for example the Daley-Kendall
and Maki-Thompson models, see Daley and Gani, 2000, for a review) would be inappropriate
in the current context, as they imply that a major crisis will always occur. An interesting
combination of epidemic and rumour models is presented in Nekovee et al. (2007) using in-
teracting Markov chains. They demonstrate that the phase transition of classical epidemics
is sufficient in characterising their model behaviour. They show that in the case of inhomo-
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geneous networks the threshold parameter should be multiplied by E(k2)/E(k) where k is
the degree of connections and E denotes the expectation operator. The E(k2)/E(k) factor
accounts for non-homogeneous contact networks, see Anderson and May (1991) for an early
discussion in the context of HIV modelling. In practice, an extension of this kind would only
affect the recovery component of the likelihood associated with the hidden epidemic model,
while the infection mechanism and subsequently the control mechanism, would remain un-
affected. Mathematically this holds true since the spreading mechanism is of second order
and its effect on the initial stages of spreading is negligible.
The superposition of poisson contact processes used in this paper may not be entirely
appropriate for banking applications since a number of studies show that the degree dis-
tribution of the interbank market network follows a power law (see for instance Arinamin-
pathy et al., 2012, and references therein). However, it should be noted that by using a
non-homogeneously mixing population we do allow for a more realistic (small world-type)
topology of the underlying interaction network along which a crisis may spread. As such, the
methodology of this paper can be used to conduct inference for a number of related mod-
els. For example, there are connections to the work of Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) where
a bank’s individual health could be determined by the local transmission rate while their
confidence indicator may be thought of as corresponding to the global rate. In addition,
the individual banks could be assigned to one of two types: large or small. Alternatively,
one could adopt a non-poisson contact process, see Streftaris and Gibson (2012) for recently
developed models where alternative renewal processes are used. Allowing for time-varying
intensities could further be of interest. These can be accommodated by replacing λIi with∫∞
0
λi(t)dt for ‘suitable’ infectiousness functions λi(t). Such extensions and variants thereof,
are left for future work.
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Appendix
Table A.1: List of countries and composition of regions
Northern America Southern Europe Eastern Asia Southern Africa
US† Bosnia China Botswana
Canada† Croatia Hong Kong† Lesotho
Greenland∗ Greece† Japan† South Africa
Central America Italy† Korea† Swaziland
Belize FYROM Macao Eastern Africa
Costa Rica Malta† Mongolia Ethiopia
El Salvador Portugal† Chinese Taipei∗∗ Kenya
Guatemala Slovenia† South East Asia Madagascar
Honduras Spain† Cambodia Malawi
Mexico Yugoslavia Indonesia Mauritius
Nicaragua Eastern Europe Laos Mozambique
Panama Belarus Malaysia Reunion∗
Southern America Bulgaria Myanmar Rwanda
Argentina Czech Republic Philippines Tanzania
Bolivia Hungary Singapore† Uganda
Brazil Moldova Thailand Zambia
Chile Poland Vietnam Zimbabwe
Colombia Romania Western Asia Western Africa
Ecuador Russia Armenia Benin
French Guiana∗ Slovak Republic Azerbaijan Burkina Faso
Guyana Ukraine Bahrain Gambia
Paraguay Western Europe Cyprus Ghana
Peru Austria† Georgia Guinea-Bissau
Suriname Belgium† Iraq Ivory Coast
Uruguay France† Israel† Liberia
Venezuela Germany† Jordan Mali
Caribbean Netherlands† Kuwait Mauritania
Bahamas Switzerland† Lebanon Niger
Barbados Central Asia Oman Nigeria
Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Qatar Senegal
Guadeloupe∗ Kyrgyzstan Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone
Haiti Tajikistan Syria Togo
Jamaica Turkmenistan Turkey Middle Africa
Martinique∗ Uzbekistan United Arab Emirates Angola
Trinidad Southern Asia Yemen Cameroon
Northern Europe Afghanistan Northern Africa Central Africa Republic
Denmark† Bangladesh Algeria Congo
Estonia India Egypt Gabon
Finland† Iran Libya Guinea
Iceland† Pakistan Morocco Zaire
Ireland† Sri Lanka Sudan Oceania
Latvia Tunisia Australia†
Lithuania Fiji
Norway† New Caledonia
Sweden† New Zealand†
UK† Papua New Guinea
Notes: The regional decomposition is based on the United Nations classification. † denotes countries classified as developed
based on the world factbook IMF classification, while the rest of the countries belong to the developing group. ∗ and ∗∗ denote
the countries that are not available in the BIS consolidated and locational banking statistics and the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS) databases, respectively, used to demonstrate the introduction of covariates into the analysis. Guinea is also
known as French Guinea. Guyana is also known as British Guiana. Zaire is what is currently known as the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Chinese Taipei is otherwise known as Taiwan. Yugoslavia is what used to be Yugoslavia SFR before its break
up.
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Table A.2: Crisis episodes and affected countries
Crisis Year Countries Affected
Break Down of Bretton Woods 1971
US, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway,
Sweden, UK, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany‡, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand
Collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement 1973
US, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden, UK, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany‡, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Japan, Australia, New Zealand
EMS Crisis 1992
Denmark, Finland‡, Ireland, Sweden, UK, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, Belgium, France
Mexican Meltdown and Tequila Effect 1994
Canada, Mexico‡, Argentina, Brazil,
Peru, Venezuela, Hungary, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand
Asian Flu 1997
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Korea,
Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore,Thailand‡, Vietnam, South Africa
Note: ‡ Denotes the country where the crisis originated. Czech Republic and Russia Federation are included in the 1971 and
1973 episodes corresponding to Czechoslovakia and USSR. The following countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croa-
tia, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, did not exist at the time of the 1971 and 1973 crisis. Slovak Republic did not exist at the
time of the 1992 crisis.
Table A.3: Percentage of trade among infected countries for the different crisis episodes
1992 Crisis
Infected countries
% of trade among
infected countries
1997 Crisis
Infected countries
% of trade among
infected countries
Denmark 0.42 Mexico 0.03
Finland 0.47 Brazil 0.09
Ireland 0.61 Czech Republic 0.07
Sweden 0.39 Hungary 0.07
UK 0.37 Poland 0.07
Italy 0.36 Pakistan 0.13
Portugal 0.55 Korea 0.15
Spain 0.48 Indonesia 0.23
Belgium 0.40 Malaysia 0.31
France 0.43 Philippines 0.19
1994 Crisis
Infected countries
% of trade among
infected countries
Singapore
Thailand
0.33
0.22
Canada 0.03 Vietnam 0.46
Mexico 0.04 South Africa 0.04
Brazil 0.08
Peru 0.14
Venezuela 0.08
Hungary 0.01
Indonesia 0.04
Philippines 0.05
Thailand 0.04
Note: Trade refers to the shares of the average of imports and exports.
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